The meaning of "offenses against the laws of nations"
by Jon Roland, Constitution Society

Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 10 of the Constitution for the United States delegates the
power to Congress to "define and punish ... Offenses against the Laws of
Nations". It is important to understand what is and is not included in the
term of art "laws of nations", and not confuse it with "international law".
They are not the same thing. The phrase "laws of nations" is a direct
translation of the Latin "jus gentium", which means the underlying
principles of right and justice among nations, and during the founding era
was not considered the same as the "laws", that is, the body of treaties and
conventions, between nations, the "jus inter gentes", which is
"international law". The distinction goes back to Roman Law.

Briefly, the Laws of Nations at the point of ratification in 1789 included
the following general elements, and prosecution of those who might violate
them:

(1) No attacks on foreign nations, their citizens, or shipping, without
either a declaration of war or letters of marque and reprisal.

(2) Honoring of the flag of truce, peace treaties, and boundary treaties.

(3) Protection of wrecked ships, their passengers and crew, and their cargo,
from depredation by those who might find them.

(4) Prosecution of piracy by whomever might be able to capture the pirates,
even if those making the capture or their nations had not been victims.

(5) Care and decent treatment of prisoners of war.

(6) Protection of foreign embassies, ambassadors, and diplomats, and of
foreign ships and their passengers, crew, and cargo while in domestic waters
or in port.

(7) Honoring of extradition treaties for criminals who committed crimes in a
nation with whom one has such a treaty who escape to one's territory or are
found on the high seas.

And, although it was not yet firmly established with all nations in 1789,

(8) Prohibition of enslavement of foreign nationals and international
trading in slaves.

No subsequent additions to the "laws of nations" could have the effect of
expanding the delegated powers under the Constitution. Ratification froze
those powers at the moment of ratification. Only the amendment procedures
provided under the Constitution can add to, subtract from, or modify them.

Some confusion on whether a treaty could confer additional powers on
government was introduced by the opinion in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920), which held that a migratory bird treaty with Canada enabled the
national government to regulate the protection and harvesting of migratory
birds within the United States, even though without the treaty the national
government would not have the power to do so. This contradicts the ancient
Law of Agency whereunder an agent, in this case federal officials, may not
acquire new powers from the exercise of a power, but only by delegation from
the principal. However, the opinion may also be read to say that it is only
state governments that are required by a treaty to exercise their already
delegated powers, and that federal courts have appellate jurisdiction over
cases of state compliance with federal treaties.

The case law was further muddied by the opinion in the case of United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), which held that executive agreements are
entitled to the same constitutional authority as treaties in the relation
between the states and the federal government, and that the supremacy clause
makes both treaties and executive agreements supreme over state power as to
the subjects covered by them. This decision has given rise to alarm by civil
libertarians, because there is no congressional approval required for
executive agreements, much less the two-thirds vote of the Senate required
for treaties, or the ratification by three-fourths of the states required
for constitutional amendments. By this reasoning, the president acting in
collusion with any foreign government could effectively eliminate states
except as voting districts.

Based on these precedents, then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
promulgated what some call the "Dulles Doctrine" that treaties, executive
agreements, and votes in the United Nations, could effectively amend the
U.S. Constitution and expand the powers of the federal government without
limit.

However, this misunderstanding about whether the constitution could be
amended through the making of treaties was denied in the case of Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957):

"This court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the
constitution over a treaty" [Reid, at p. 17].

"... when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict, renders the treaty null."
[Reid, supra, citing Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 238, at p. 267]

"No agreement with a foreign nation (no exec. orders, no Pres. directives,
no "accords" etc.) can confer power on Congress or any other branch of
government, which is free from the restraints of the constitution" [Reid,
supra].

Despite the decision in Reid v. Covert, however, the dominant faction in the
federal government continues to maintain the Dulles Doctrine, arguing that
Reid only applied to infringements on rights recognized in the Constitution,
and did not prevent expansion of federal powers through treaty, even though
one of the fundamental rights recognized in the Tenth Amendment was the
right not to have government exercise powers not delegated to it.

"I will make a Star-Chamber matter of it!"           —Shakespeare, The Merry Wives of Windsor. I.i., 414.

STAR CHAMBER, the name given in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries to an English court of justice. The name is probably derived from the stars with which the roof of the chamber was painted; it was the camera stellata. 

The origin and early history of the court are somewhat obscure. The curia regis of the 12th century, combining judicial, deliberative and administrative functions, had thrown off several offshoots in the Court of King's Bench and other courts, but the Crown never parted with its supreme jurisdiction. When in the 13th century the King's Council became a regular and permanent body, practically distinct from parliament, this supreme jurisdiction continued to be exercised by the King in council. As the ordinary courts of law became more important and more systematic, the indefinite character of the council's jurisdiction gave rise to frequent complaints, and efforts, for the most part fruitless, were made by the parliaments of the 14th century to check it. The equitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor, which grew up during the reign of Edward III like the courts of law under Henry II, was derived from this supreme judicial power, which was yet unexhausted.

It is in the reign of Edward III, after an Act of 1341, that we first hear of the Chancellor, Treasurer, Justices and other members of the King's Council exercising jurisdiction in the old chamber, or chambre de estoiles, at Westminster. In Henry VI's reign one Danvers was acquitted of a certain charge by the council in the camera stellata. Hitherto such acts of parliament as had recognized this jurisdiction had done so only by way of limitation or prohibition, but in 1453, about the time when the distinction between the ordinary and the Privy Council first became apparent, an act was passed empowering the Chancellor to enforce the attendance of all persons summoned by the Privy Seal before the King and his Council in all cases not determinable by Common Law. At this time, then, the jurisdiction of the Council was recognized as supplementary to that of the ordinary courts of law. But the anarchy of the Wars of the Roses and the decay of local justice, owing to the influence of the great barons and the turbulence of all classes, obliged parliament to entrust wider powers to the Council. This was the object of the famous Act of 1487, which was incorrectly quoted by the lawyers of the Long Parliament as creating the Court of Star Chamber, which was in reality of earlier origin.

The Act of 1487 (3 Hen. VII.) created a court composed of seven persons, the Chancellor, the Treasurer, the Keeper of the Privy Seal, or any two of them, with a bishop, a temporal lord and the two chief justices, or in their absence two other justices. It was to deal with cases of "unlawful maintainance, giving of licences, signs and tokens, great riots, unlawful assemblies"; in short with all offences against the law which were too serious to be dealt with by the ordinary courts. The jurisdiction thus entrusted to this committee of the council was not supplementary, therefore, like that granted in 1453, but it superseded the ordinary courts of law in cases where these were too weak to act. The act simply supplied machinery for the exercise, under special circumstances, of that extraordinary penal jurisdiction which the council had never ceased to possess. By an act of 1529 an eighth member, the President of the Council, was added to the Star Chamber, the jurisdiction of which was at the same time confirmed. At this time the court performed a very necessary and valuable work in punishing powerful offenders who could not be reached by the ordinary courts of law. It was found very useful by Cardinal Wolsey, and a little later Sir Thomas Smith says its object was "to bridle such stout noblemen or gentlemen who would offer wrong by force to any manner of men, and cannot be content to demand or defend the right by order of the law." 

It is popularly supposed that the star chamber, after an existence of about fifty years, disappeared towards the end of the reign of Henry VIII, the powers obtained by the Act of 1487 being not lost, but reverting to the Council as a whole. This may have been so, but it is more probable that the Star Chamber continued to exist side by side with the Council, and the two bodies were certainly separate during the latter part of Elizabeth's reign. The Act of 1540, which gave the King's proclamation the force of law, enacted that offenders against them were to be punished by the usual officers of the council, together with some bishops and judges "in the Star Chamber or elsewhere." It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear distinction between the duties of the Privy Council and the duties of the Star Chamber at this time, although before the abolition of the latter there was a distinction "as to their composition and as to the matters dealt with by the two courts." During the reign of Elizabeth, Sir Thomas Smith remarks that juries misbehaving "were many times commanded to appear in the Star Chamber, or before the Privy Council for the matter." The uncertain composition of the court is well shown by Sir Edward Coke, who says that the Star Chamber is or may be compounded of three several councils: (i) the Lords and others of the Privy Council; (2) the judges of either bench and the barons of the Exchequer; (3) the Lords of Parliament, who are not, however, standing judges of the court. William Hudson (d. 1635), on the other hand, considers that all peers had the right of sitting in the court, but if so they had certainly given up the privilege in the 17th century.

The jurisdiction of the Star Chamber was as vague as its constitution. Hudson says it is impossible to define it without offending the supporters of the prerogative by a limitation of its powers, or the lawyers by attributing to it an excessive latitude. In practice its jurisdiction was almost unlimited. It took notice of riots, murder, forgery, felony, perjury, fraud, libel and slander, duels and acts tending to treason, as well as of some civil matters, such as disputes about land between great men and corporations, disputes between English and foreign merchants, and testamentary cases; in fact, as Hudson says, "all offences may be here examined and punished if the King will." Its procedure was not according to theCommon Law. It dispensed with the encumbrance of a jury; it could proceed on rumour alone; it could apply torture; it could inflict any penalty but death. It was thus admirably calculated to be the support of order against anarchy, or of despotism against individual and national liberty. 

During the Tudor period it appeared in the former light, under the Stuarts in the latter. Under the Tudors, as S. R. Gardiner says, it was "a tribunal constantly resorted to as a resource against the ignorance or prejudices of a country jury," and adds that "in such investigations it showed itself intelligent and impartial." Under James I and Charles I all this was changed; the Star Chamber became the great engine of the royal tyranny. Hateful and excessive punishments were inflicted on those brought before the court, notable among whom were Prynne, Bastwick and Burton, and the odium which it gathered around it was one of the causes which led to the popular discontent against Charles I. As it became more unpopular its jurisdiction was occasionally questioned. An example of this kind occurred in 1629, but the barons of the Exchequer who heard the case declared that the Star Chamber was created many years before the statute of Henry VII and that it was "one of the most high and honourable courts of justice." 

It was abolished by an act of parliament of July 1641. In 1661 a committee of the House of Lords reported "that it was fit for the good of the nation that there be a court of like nature to the Star Chamber"; but nothing further was done in the matter. 

What is a Militia, as Penned to Paper and Sanctioned by the Commonwealth of Virginia and the US Government

Mouse over the red coat and click to get in PDF

§ 44-1. Composition of militia. — The militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall consist of all able-bodied residents of the Commonwealth who are citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied persons resident in the Commonwealth who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who are at least 16 years of age and, except as hereinafter provided, not more than 55 years of age. The militia shall be divided into four classes: the National Guard, which includes the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard; the Virginia Defense Force; the naval militia; and the unorganized militia. (1930, p. 948; 1942, p. 642; Michie Code 1942, § 2673(1); 1944, p. 24; 1958, c. 393; 1970, c. 662; 1973, c. 401; 1976, c. 399; 1979, c. 647; 1984, c. 765; 1989, c. 414; 2011, cc. 572, 586.)Virginia Code § 44-1.

Thomas Jefferson On the Failure to Treat Law As A Science

"The exclusion from the courts of the malign influence of all authorities after (King George III’s ascendency) would uncanonize Blackstone, whose book, although the most elegant and best digested law catalouge, has been perverted more than all others, to the degeneracy of legal science.

Jefferson	Blackstone	Tyler

A student finds there is a smattering of everything, and his indolence easily persuades him that if he understands that book, he is master of the whole body of law. The distinction between these, and those who have drawn their stores from the rich mines of Coke and Littleton, seems well understood even by the unlettered common people, who apply the appellation of ‘Blackstone lawyers’ to those ephemeral insects of the law." (Thomas Jefferson to Judge John Tyler, 1812).

The Ancient ‘Science’ of law has been forgotten. To get a the picture of how the Congress, the President and the Courts have and are failing us you need to read the work of St. George Tucker.

Home to prominent Williamsburg officer and judge Rambling and graceful wooden structure Home accommodated Tucker's large and growing family First Christmas tree in Williamsburg displayed at house in 1842 Home restored in 1930 and 1931 Tucker's descendants lived in house until 1993

Tucker gives essence to;

Yet the study of the constitution is not more necessary to the right understanding of the force and obligation of any positive law, than the study of the law, as a science, is to a full and perfect understanding of the constitution: for the rules of law must not unfrequently be consulted, to explain the principles contained in the constitution: thus, they mutually contribute to the due investigation and understanding of each other [*On the Study of Law - St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States with Selected Writings (1803)].

To read the full text of what Tucker has/had to say about the Study of Law mouse over his portrait and click

St. George Tucker (July 10, 1752 – November 10, 1827), born in Bermuda, was; an officer in the American Revolutionary Army, a lawyer and professor of law at the College of William and Mary(Dean of the School of Law and mentor to Thomas Jefferson, et.al.; he was elected as a justice of the Virginia General District Court and later appointed to the Virginia Supreme Court (known as the Court of Appeals until 1970); judge of the Federal District Court for Virginia by appointment of President James Madison, progenitor of a long line of jurists and scholars, and stepfather of John Randolph of Roanoke.

*Tucker, St. George. Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 5 vols. Philadelphia, 1803.]

The Full Reference material UARF relied on may be obtained from Amazon.

More on Tucker

There is no debt crisis, no need to put the day of August 2, 2011 as a fail safe date for the economic collapse of the US economy if the law is followed;

U.S. Constitution U.S. Con. 14th Amd., § 4 (1868): Section 4. What Public Debts Are Valid. -- The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,. . . shall not be questioned. U.S. Constitution U.S. Con. 14th Amd., § 4 (1868).

The language [The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,. . . shall not be questioned] found in U.S. Constitution 14th Amd., § 4 (1868) is general and therefore applicable to all public debts.

The matter of the validity of public debt and the obligation to pay it became settled law when it was addressed in organic law by the adoption of this clause found in the 14^th Amd..

All that we hear from BAM, the GOP and DEMS on the fail safe date is hype, pure and simple BS, it just that simple.

Social security is a public debt of the United States, authorized by law;

Troop deployment is a public debt of the United States, authorized by law;

The Courts are a public debt of the United States, authorized by law;

All operations of any and all branches of the Federal government and its agencies are a public debt of the United States, authorized by law.

If the branch/agency of government or its activity is not authorized by law then the debt is not authorized, nor the payment of any debt related to it. It is just that simple.

The language [The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,. . . shall not be questioned] found in U.S. Constitution 14th Amd., § 4 (1868) is general and therefore applicable to all public debts.

I will repest this again and again for nay sayers.....READ the Scottish Dec of Indep. which DOES speak of their Israelite Heritages.......This is an OLD Document......one should check it out. You will be well pleased you did.